Singularity with Respect to Strategic Measures by Prikry, Karel & Sudderth, William
\ 
SINGULARITY WITH RESPECT 
TO STRATEGIC MEASURES 
by 
Karel Prikry* and William Sudderth* 
University of Minnesota 
Technical Report 381 
October 1980 
* Research supported by National Science Foundation Grants MCS74-06705-A03 
for (Prikry) and MCS77-28424 (for Sudderth). 
Abstract 
Let µ be the finitely additive probability measure defined on the 
product Xx Y of two copies of the natural numbers by the formula 
µ(S) = f a(sY) f3(dy) 
where SC Xx Y, sY = {x:(x, y) e: s} for each ye: Y, and a and 8 
~----~~-~~-- ------------~ 
are finitely additive probability measures on X and Y, respectively. 
Then µ is singular with respect to every strategic measure on Xx Y 
(i.e. every measure on Xx Y which has a conditional distribution for 
y given x) if and only if a and 8 are purely.finitely additive. 
Furthermore, µ is approximable in variation norm by strategic measures 
if and only if either a or 8 is countably additive. 
AMS 1970 subject classifications: 60G05, 60B05, 28A60, 46A40. 
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1. Introduction. 
By a probability on a nonempty set X is meant a finitely additive 
probability measure defined on all subsets of X. A conditional probability 
on a nonempty set Y given X is a mapping from X to the set of 
probabilities on Y. A strategy a on the cartesian product Xx Y is a 
pair (cr0 , a1) where cr0 is a probability on X and cr1 is a condi-
tional probability on Y given X. Each such strategy cr determines a 
probability on Xx Y which is also denoted by cr and is defined by 
(1.1) 
where SC Xx Y and, for each x £ X, S = {y:.(x, y) £ s}. Probabilities 
X 
which arise from strategies in this fashion are called strategic. 
For the rest of this note, let X = Y = {l, 2, } and let a and 
S be probabilites on X. Define a probability µ on Xx Y by the formula 
(1.2) µ(S) = f a.(Sy) f3(dy) 
for SC X x Y and sY = { x: (x, y) £ s} for every y £ Y. Notice that 
µ is reverse strategic in the sense that it is strategic when the co-
ordinates are interchanged. If a and S are countably additive, then 
µ is also strategic as follows from Fubini's Theorem or a general result 
on the existence of conditional distributions. Our major result states 
that the situation is quite different for diffuse measures. (A 
probability a on X is diffuse or purely finitely additive if 
a({x}) = 0 for every x £ X.) 
Theorem. If a and S are diffuse, then µ is singular with respect 
to every strategic measure. 
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Lester Dubins [2] proved this result for the special case when a and 
8 assume only the values O and 1, and thereby exhibited the first 
example of a probability which could not be approximated ·by strategic 
measures. 
A probability v on Xx Y is nearly strategic if it lies in the 
variation norm closure of the strategic measures. The following result is 
an easy consequence of a theorem of Dubins [2, Proposition 2]. 
Proposition. If a or 8 is countably additive, then µ is nearly 
strategic. 
The converses to both the Theorem and the Proposition are true. To 
see this, write 
where p, qe [O, 1], p = 1-p, q = 1-q, a 1 and 81 are countably additive 
probabilities, and a
2 
and 82 ~~i~fuse. (To obtain the decomposition 
for a, for example, set p = L a({x}) and, for ACX, set 
Xe:: X 
--~- ·---~ 
a({ x}) if p =I= 0 and let 
additive probability if p = 0.) Let µ .. l.J 
be an arbitrary countably 
be the probability on Xx Y 
defined by formula (1.2) when a and 8 are replaced there by ai and 
8j, respectively. Then 
= (1-pq) V + pqµ22 
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where V is defined by the second equality. By the Theorem, is 
singular with respect to every strategic measure. By the Proposition, the 
remaining µ .. 's are nearly strategic and, by a result of Armstrong and 
1.J 
Sudderth [l, Theorem 1], v, being a convex combination of nearly 
strategic measures, is itself nearly strategic. Furthermore, this 
decomposition of µ into nearly strategic and singular parts is 
essentially unique [l, Corollary 1]. Thus, if µ is nearly strategic, 
then pq = 0 which proves the converse to the Proposition. Likewise, if 
µ is singular with respect to every strategic measure, then pq = 1 which 
proves the converse to the Theorem. 
The next section presents the proof of the Theorem. A final section 
contains a few remarks and open questions. 
2. Proof of the Theorem. 
The proof uses a slightly more general notion of strategic measure. 
Suppose cr0 is a probability on X and, for every x, cr1 (x) is a 
finitely additive measure defined on all subsets of X which has total 
mass less than or equal to one. Then (cr0 , cr1) is a generalized strategy 
and the measure cr of (1.1) is generalized strategic. 
What will be shown is that given such a cr and given £ > 0, there 
is a set SC Xx Y such that cr(S) < £ and µ(S) = 1. Three cases will 
be considered. 
Case 1. For all x £ X, cr1 (x) is diffuse. 
Take S = {(x, y) 
µ(S) = 1. 
x > y}. It is easy to check that cr(S) = 0 and 
Case 2. For all x EX, cr1 (x) is countably additive. 
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This is the most involved of the three cases and the proof takes 
several steps. 
For each y £ Y, let 
(2.1) Ey = f cr1 (x) ({ y} )a(dx), 
and set Y = { y:s = o}, 1 y y2 = {y:~y > O} so that y is the disjoint 
union of yl with Y2. Two sets s1 and s2 will be constructed so as 
to satisfy for i = 1,2, 
s.cxxy_ 
1 1 
cr(S.) < 2£, µ(S.) =µ(Xx Y.) 
1 1 1 
Then S = s1 U s2 will satisfy 
cr(S) < 4£, µ(S) = 1, 
which will complete the proof for this case. 
First s1 will be defined. For each y £ Y1 and every o > 0, 
Thus, if 
and 
a{x:crl (x)({y}) < o} = 1. 
AY = { x:cr
1 
(x) ({y}) < £/2Y} 
s 1 = u (A x { y}), y£Yl y 
then, for each y £ Y1 , 
and 
Hence, 
sY = A 1 y 
However, for every x, 
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the x-section s 1,x 
which, by the countable additivity of cr1 (x), has cr1 (x)-measure less than 
or equal to 
Hence, 
o(s1) =Jo1(x)(s1,x)o0(dx) 
5.._ /zE cr0 (dx) 
= 2e:. 
The following lemma is used in the construction of s2 . 
Lemma. Le: < 1. 
ye:Y y-
"'."" 7 -
Proof: For every n e: Y, 
(2. 2) 
I; e: =/{ I; cr1 (x)({ y}) }a.(dx) y<n Y y~n 
:;_/a1(x)(Y)a.(dx) 
< 1. 
By the Lemma, there is an n such that 
Le: < e:. 
y>n y 
Let { K , y > n} be a sequence of positive numbers such that y 
(2. 3) lim K = 00 , L K e: < 1. 
y~ y y>n y y -
The existence of such a sequence is well-known and easy to verify. 
(2.4) 
If e: > O, then y 
0. ( { X: Ol ( X )( { y}) > e: ( 1 + K e:) } ) < ( 1 + K e:
2
) - l 
- y y - y 
because otherwise, by (2.1), 
e: -1 
e: > e: (1 + K e:)(1 + K -2) > e:. y- y y y y 
For each ye: Y2, set 
A = { x: cr1 (x) ({ y}) < e: (1 + K e:)}. y y y 
Then, by (2.4), for y > n and ye: Y2, 
e: -1 
a.(A) > 1 - (1 + K -2) y - y 
and so, by (2.3), 
(2.5) 
Define 
a(A) + 1 as y + oo. y 
s2 = u (A x { y}) • yEY2 Y 
y>n 
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Because of (2.5) and the diffuseness of S, 
= 8(Y2) 
Also, for each x, the x-section s 2,x is { y E Y2 :y > n, a1 (x) ({ y }) 
< £ (1 +KE)}, which, by the countable additivity of a1 (x), has y y 
- --- ----~ ----
crl (x)-measureless than or equal to 
Le: (1 + K e:) = Le: + e: L K e: 
y>n Y y y>n Y y>n Y y 
~ 2e:, 
by (2.2) and (2.3). Hence, cr(S2) < 2E. 
This completes the argument for Case II. 
Case 3. a1 is arbitrary. 
For every Xe: X and every A ex, let 
a~ (x)(A) = ~ o1 (x)({ y}) ye:A 
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and let 
Thus is countably additive and is diffuse for each x. 
Case I applies to the generalized strategy 
sd c x x Y such that 
generalized strategy 
crc(Sc) < ~ and µ(S) 
C 
Set S = Sc n Sd. 
µ(S) = 1 
and 
< e:. 
d e: 
a (Sd) < 2 
crc C 
= (crO,crl) 
= 1. 
Then 
and µ(Sd) = 1. Case II applies to the 
to yield S C X x Y such that 
C 
The proof of Theorem 1 is now complete. 
3. Remarks. 
One might be misled by the results presented so far to think that 
reverse strategic measures are strategic only if they are countably additive. 
Here is a simple counterexample. 
Example. Write X = U X where the 
n=l n 
X are disjoint, infinite sets. 
n 
For every ye: Y, let a(y) be a diffuse probability on X • y Define the 
reverse strategic measure µ by 
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(3.1) µ(S) =/a(y)(Sy)B(dy) 
for SC Xx Y. Then, as is almost obvious, µ is also the measure induced 
by the strategy (a0,a1) where a0 is the marginal of µ on X and a1 (x) 
is point mass at y when X £ X • y 
Additional example of diffuse measures on Xx Y which are strategic 
in both directions are in Heath and Sudderth [3, Theorem 3]. However, there 
is as yet no satisfactory theorem which characterizes those reverse strategic 
measures which are also strategic. 
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Addendum: Mr. S. Ramakrishnan has pointed out to us that our Proposition 
can be improved to say that, if a or 8 is countably additive, then µ 
is strategic. This follows immediately from the fact that, if a or 8 
is countably additive, then 
for every bounded, real-valued f defined on N x N. This fact is easy 
to verify; just approximate the countably additive measure by a linear 
combination of point masses. 
